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Strategic Impact of Internet Referral Services on Channel Profits
Abstract
Internet Referral Services, hosted either by independent third-party infomediaries or by man-
ufacturers serve as “lead-generators” in electronic marketplaces, directing consumer traffic to
particular retailers. In a model of price dispersion with mixed strategy equilibria, we investigate
the competitive implications of these institutions on retailer and manufacturer pricing strategies
as well as their impact on channel structures and distribution of profits. Offline, retailers face
a higher customer acquisition cost. In return, they can engage in price discrimination. Online,
they save on the acquisition costs, but lose the ability to price discriminate. This critical tradeoff
drives firms’ equilibrium strategies. The establishment of a referral service is a strategic decision
by the manufacturer, in response to a third-party infomediary. It leads to an increase in channel
profits and a reallocation of the increased surplus to the manufacturer, via the franchise fees.
Further, it enables the manufacturer to respond to an infomediary, by giving itself a wider leeway
to set the unit wholesale fee to the profit maximizing level. We discuss implications of referral
services on channel coordination issues, and whether a two part tariff can be successfully used
to maximize channel profits. Contrary to prior literature, we find that when retailers can price
discriminate among consumers, the manufacturer may not set the wholesale price to marginal
cost to coordinate the channel. Consistent with anecdotal evidence, our model predicts that
while it is optimal for an infomediary to enroll only one retailer, it is optimal for a manufacturer
to enroll both retailers. Finally, our results show that under some circumstances, the manufac-
turer even benefits from the presence of the competing referral infomediary and hence, will not
want to eliminate it.
Keywords: Referral Services, Price Dispersion, Franchise Fees, Acquisition Costs, Infome-
diary, Channel Management.
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1 Introduction
Consumers’ affinity for neutral information has led to the emergence of a large number of inde-
pendent sources on the Internet that offer high-quality information about firms’ products, their
availability and prices, at no cost to consumers. These infomediaries offer consumers the opportu-
nity to get price quotes from enrolled brick-and-mortar retailers as well as invoice prices, reviews
and specifications. While a referral service does not, in fact, “sell” any product, it does shift much
of the consumer search process from the physical platform of the traditional retailer to the virtual
world of the Web.
Consider the auto industry in the U.S. - an industry with $ 500 billion in revenues. Auto
manufacturers are prohibited by franchise laws from selling directly to consumers. Both infome-
diaries and manufacturers now offer web-based referral services, which are growing in popularity.
Industry-wide, 6% of all new vehicles in 2001 were sold through an online buying service, up from
4.7% in 2000.1 In 2001, Autobytel generated an estimated $17 billion in car sales.2
Given the advent of such third-party referral brokers, the major OEMs like GM and Ford have
set up their own referral websites such as GMBuyPower.com and FordDirect.com. From these sites,
consumers can configure a new car, receive the list price and be led to a dealer site for inventory
and quotes. The payoff to improving such a referral website can be substantial. It is estimated
that an $800,000 effort to fix common website problems can create $250,000 of additional leads per
month at an average manufacturer site.3 Crucially, manufacturers provide referrals to dealers free
of cost, while third-party infomediaries charge referral fees to participating dealers.
Selling directly establishes the manufacturer as a direct competitor to its reseller partner, po-
tentially leading to channel conflict. Hence, firms in other industries are also beginning to use
their own websites to steer consumers to retailers. For example, IBM takes orders for PCs over
the Web, but redirects the sales to its distributors. Hewlett-Packard’s “Commerce Center” is not
an on-line store per se—it simply gives business customers an easy, point-and-click way to order
from an HP reseller.4 On the other hand, manufacturers compete with third-party infomediaries
1“More Car Buyers Hitting the Web First,” www.EcommerceTimes.com, 11/27/01.
2“Autobytel Survey,” www.CNET.com, 06/25/02.
3“Get ROI From Design”, Forrester Report, June 2001.
4Garner, R. (1999). “Mad as hell,” June 1, 54, Sales & Marketing Management
like CNET.com in the lead generation business.
The conventional wisdom on Internet referral infomediaries (or online buying services as they
are increasingly being called), is that they are valuable to consumers because they reduce the search
costs of comparing prices in electronic markets and get binding price quotes from retailers. However
the impact of these infomediaries on manufacturers is not very clear. In addition, a manufacturer’s
entry into the online referral business has implications for pricing, allocation of channel profits
and retail competition. The effect of such referral competition between a manufacturer and a
third-party infomediary, on the division of channel profits has not been studied previously. Models
that analyze firm conduct and coordination in distribution channels (Jeuland and Shugan, 1983;
Moorthy, 1987; Ingene and Parry 1995; Coughlan 1995) typically do not consider the influence
of third-party infomediaries on channel strategies. While Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2003) consider
the impact of third-party information on profits in a channel consisting of two manufacturers and
one retailer, they do not consider the effect of profit-maximizing information intermediary, on a
manufacturer’s profits.
1.1 Research Questions
In this setting, we examine the following questions.
• What strategic implications does the entry of a referral infomediary have for an upstream
manufacturer? How do referral services, both independent and manufacturer-sponsored, affect
the optimal pricing strategies of retailers in a channel?
• If a manufacturer cannot sell directly to consumers, can it still extract higher profits from
the channel by diverting traffic online? How does the two-part tariff (wholesale price and
franchise fee) change these circumstances?
• Should the manufacturer follow an exclusive or a non-exclusive strategy of enrollment vis-a-vis
an infomediary? Can, and should it eliminate the referral infomediary?
1.2 Prior Literature and Results
We consider a model with a distribution channel consisting of a manufacturer, an infomediary, and
two retailers. We focus, in particular, on the response of the manufacturer to the presence of an
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infomediary. Since, consumers are heterogenous both in their valuations and in search behavior,
price dispersion exists in equilibrium. Price dispersion has been extensively studied, both theo-
retically (Varian, 1980, and Narasimhan, 1988, for example) and empirically ( Brynjolfsson and
Smith, 2000 and Clemons, Hann and Hitt, 2002). There is a growing literature on the impact of
the Internet and Internet based institutions on price competition (Lal and Sarvary 1999, Baye and
Morgan 2001, Iyer and Pazgal 2003). One goal of this paper is to bridge the vast literatures on
channel management and price dispersion.
In a related paper, Chen, Iyer and Padmanabhan 2002 (hereafter CIP) examine how an info-
mediary affects the market competition between retailers, and the contractual arrangements that
they should use in selling their services. They identify the conditions necessary for the infomediary
to exist and explain how they would evolve with the growth of the Internet. Our paper differs from
their work in many important areas. The most important difference is that our paper considers
both infomediary owned as well as manufacturer owned referral services. The focus of our paper is
on the overall impact of referral services on manufacturer profits. Further, we study the impact of
an upstream manufacturer’s referral service on the behavior of downstream retailers as well as on
the infomediary. We also shed light on the consequences of referral services on closing ratios and
channel coordination issues in our paper. There are several modelling differences as well. First,
consumers in our model are heterogenous in two dimensions. While CIP (2002) consider hetero-
geneity only in consumer search behavior, we also consider heterogeneity in consumer valuations
for the same product. Second, a key feature in our model is incorporation of a difference between
online and offline acquisition costs incurred by retailers in serving each prospective customer. This
is based on empirical evidence as pointed out by Scott-Morton and Zettelmeyer (2001). In fact, the
presence of customer acquisition costs prevents the Infomediary from unravelling. Third, another
critical aspect in our model is a retailer’s ability to infer consumer valuations offline. In the offline
channel, consumers physically walk into stores, and retailers are able to determine willingness to
pay, via a costly interaction. This enables them to discriminate offline between high and low valu-
ation consumers. However, online they lose this ability to price discriminate. In an industry such
as the auto industry, purchases are infrequent, with significant time gaps. In such a setting, it is
reasonable to think of consumer preferences changing from one purchase to the next, and hence of
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a lack of availability of consumer valuation information, online. Thus we model the critical tradeoff
retailers face between lower customer acquisition costs online versus higher consumer information
offline.
We find that, first, the establishment of manufacturer referral services, along with the strategic
utilization of the wholesale price leads to an increase in channel profits and a reallocation of some
of the increased surplus, through its franchise fee, to the manufacturer. The impetus to increased
profits comes from three sources: (i) mitigation of price competition among downstream retailers
by the adjustment of the wholesale price by the manufacturers, (ii) retailers’ ability to price dis-
criminate between informed and uninformed consumers, and (iii) by the lowering of acquisition
costs of each retailer due to diversion of traffic from the offline to the online channel. Under some
conditions (when offline acquisition costs are high enough), the two-part tariff is able to achieve
higher channel profits than those under a vertically integrated system.
Second, we find that the manufacturer even benefits from the presence of the infomediary,
once it has established its own referral service. Basically the infomediary’ referral price prevents
the enrolled retailer from spiralling into aggravated price competition with the other retailer, by
creating sufficient differentiation in consumers’ search behavior. This leads to higher prices on
an average for both retailers. Consequently, the manufacturer might not want to strategically
eliminate the infomediary. In fact, it cannot eliminate the infomediary even if it wants to. It can
adjust the wholesale price to reduce the advantage that the infomediary-enrolled retailer has due
to price discrimination. However, the presence of the infomediary also reduces acquisition costs
for the enrolled retailer, allowing the infomediary to capture some of the gains. Consequently as
long as consumers are widely heterogeneous in their search behavior, the referral infomediary will
continue to survive.
Third, we show that the optimal wholesale price (W) of the manufacturer offering a two-part
tariff, is not equal to its marginal cost. Rather, it is set to equal the valuation of the low type
consumers in the market. This is in contrast to prior literature where it has been shown that in a
two-part tariff setting the wholesale price to marginal costs achieves channel coordination. This is
driven by the fact that retailers can price discriminate in the offline channels. Basically, by charging
a higher wholesale price the upstream manufacturer is able to enforce an equilibrium which leads
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to higher profits for each retailer, by alleviating price competition among the downstream players.
The establishment of a referral service by the manufacturer enables it to respond to the entry of an
infomediary, by giving itself a wider leeway to set the unit wholesale fee to the profit maximizing
level.
Fourth, average online prices offered by retailers to users of the manufacturer’s referral service
are higher than infomediary referral prices. This is similar in notion to an “MSRP” which is the
highest possible price consumers are expected to pay under normal market conditions. Thus this
result also reconciles well with practice and empirical evidence (Scott-Morton et al. 2003b).
Finally, we show that a manufacturer has an incentive to enroll both retailers in its referral
service. This is in accordance with anecdotal evidence, which suggests that a manufacturer does
not differentiate between its dealers in this regard. One possible explanation of this practice could
simply be to avoid the Robinson-Patman Act which prohibits manufacturers from discriminating
between retailers. Our model shows that there is also a strategic incentive for the manufacturer to
adopt a non-discriminatory policy and enroll both retailers in its referral service.
This paper, therefore, offers a different viewpoint on how manufacturers can increase profits
by diverting consumer traffic into online channels and optimally setting a two-part tariff. In the
auto industry, manufacturers cannot directly sell to consumers. However, they can extract higher
profits from the channel by increasing their franchise fee and changing their per-unit fee. This
provides them with an incentive to reduce the acquisition costs in the channel by inducing more
consumers to visit their online referral services. The tradeoff is that, since consumer purchases in
this industry are infrequent, little information about consumers is available online without face-to-
face interaction. Offline, a retailer is able to infer a consumer’s willingness to pay by being exposed
to cues like clothing and body language. We show that the cost savings dominate any losses due
to the absence of online information. Further, in the presence of competition from a third party
infomediary, a manufacturer can use a referral service as a device to regain some control over the
channel. While we touch upon the channel coordination problem for a manufacturer using a two-
part tariff and highlight circumstances when it can coordinate the channel, we abstract away from
offering any mechanisms as solutions to the coordination problem. A complete analysis of channel
coordination mechanisms will require a downward sloping demand curve, which is beyond the scope
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of our model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related research and
presents the basic model. Section 3 examines a benchmark case when no referral services exist,
while Section 4 analyzes the effect of the infomediary on retail competition. In Section 5 we examine
the impact of manufacturer referral services on equilibrium strategies and policies, and provide some
empirical corroboration of our results. Section 6 provides some business implications, while Section
7 concludes with a brief summary of the main results and some possible extensions. All proofs are
relegated to the Appendix.
2 Model
2.1 Retailers and Manufacturer
We consider a market with a single manufacturer and two competing retailers, D1 and D2. The
manufacturer charges the retailers a franchise fee, F and optimally sets the wholesale price of the
good charged to the retailers, W . We analyze the retailing world under three scenarios: (i) with
no referral services (ii) with a referral infomediary, and (iii) with a referral infomediary as well as
a manufacturer referral website. The referrals are online, so in scenarios (ii) and (iii), the retailers
make some online sales in addition to offline ones. All sales are offline in scenario (i).
Retailers incur an acquisition cost, δ, for each offline customer catered to. δ represents the
difference in acquisition costs between offline and online customers. This includes the cost of time
spent in providing product information and in negotiation, offering test drives, and completing
paperwork. Ratchford, et al (2002) shows that the Internet leads to a considerable reduction in
consumer time spent with dealer/manufacturer sources. Since our results depend only on the
difference between offline and online acquisition costs, the online cost is normalized to zero. The
tradeoff faced by a retailer is that, offline, it can perfectly observe a consumer’s valuation via
the interaction process. Hence, the offline price offered to a consumer depends on this valuation,
allowing for price discrimination.
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2.2 Referral infomediary
The referral infomediary enrolls one retailer, D2, and allows consumers to obtain an online price
quote from this retailer. The infomediary charges the retailer a fixed referral fee of K. Firms like
Autobytel.com and Carpoint.com charge an average fixed monthly fee of around $1,000 depending
on dealer size and sales (Moon 2000). If the infomediary enrolled both retailers, Bertrand com-
petition would prevail in the online segments, with prices equal to marginal cost, as shown in the
Appendix B.5 Therefore, the infomediary can charge a higher fee when it enrolls just one retailer.
In practice, too, dealers are assigned exclusive geographic territories by infomediaries (see Moon
2000).
2.3 Consumers
The market consists of a unit mass of consumers. Consumers are heterogenous both in terms of
their valuation, and in their search behavior, which determines the market segment they belong
to. A consumer’s valuation for the good is either high, V h, or low, V `, where V h > V ` > 0. The
proportion of high valuation consumers is λH , and that of low valuation consumers is λL = 1−λH .
Each consumer buys either zero or one unit of the product.
Consumers belong to different market segments. The notion of market segments allows for the
existence of consumers with both different levels of awareness about alternate avenues for price
quotes, and different search behaviors. Depending on the segment she belongs to, a consumer
observes a different set of prices for the good. A consumer with valuation j (j = h, `) buys the
product if her net utility is positive; i.e., V j − Pmin ≥ 0, where Pmin is the minimum price offered
to this consumer.6
There are three distinct consumer segments: a proportion αu of “uninformed” consumers who
are unaware of the existence of an infomediary and obtain a price from just one retailer, a pro-
portion αp of “partially informed” consumers who obtain a price from one retailer and the referral
infomediary (when it exists), and a proportion 1 − αu − αp of “fully informed” consumers, who
5Since this has also been shown by CIP 2002 in their model, we do not make it a focus of our paper.
6To keep the setup generalized, we do not assume any correlation between consumer valuations and search behavior.
While there is empirical evidence that higher income people are more likely to have access to the Internet, there is
also countervailing evidence that they have more search costs.
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obtain prices from both retailers as well as the referral infomediary.
When a consumer approaches a retailer for a price quote, the retailer is unable to distinguish
which market segment a consumer belongs to. In other words, either offline or online, a retailer
cannot determine if a particular consumer belongs to the uninformed, partially or fully informed
segments. Offline, the retailer is able to determine the consumer’s valuation for the product.
3 Offline World: No Referral Services Exist
We now analyze each of the three scenarios mentioned, in turn, starting with the case of no referral
services. Each of the scenarios is described as a multi-stage game. We consider a subgame-perfect
equilibrium of the game in each case, and therefore analyze the game via backward induction. When
neither the referral infomediary nor the manufacturer referral service exist, the stages in the game
are as follows. In Stage 1, the manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F and the optimal wholesale
price W for each retailer. In Stage 2, retailers simultaneously choose retail prices (P1(V
h), P1(V
`))
and (P2(V
h), P2(V
`)). In Stage 3, consumers decide which product to buy.
Consider the three market segments:
(i) uninformed consumers, of market size αu , observe just one offline price from one retailer. We
assume these consumers are equally likely to visit D1 and D2.
(ii) partially informed consumers, of size αp , behave in exactly the same way as uninformed con-
sumers when there is no infomediary. Hence, these consumers also visit D1 and D2 with equal
probability.
(iii) informed consumers, of size 1− αu − αp , obtain prices from both retailers.
The prices observed by consumers in different market segments are depicted in Figure 1. In the
offline world, the retailers perfectly observe each consumer’s valuation. Hence, the prices offered to
consumers depend on their valuations, as shown in the figure.
Types αu2
αu
2
αp
2
αp
2 1− αu − αp
HV Consumers P1(V
h) P2(V
h) P1(V
h) P2(V
h) P1(V
h), P2(V
h)
LV Consumers P1(V
`) P2(V
`) P1(V
`) P2(V
`) P1(V
`), P2(V
`)
Figure 1: Prices observed by each consumer segment when no Referral Service exists
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Since consumer valuations are observed offline, this basic model reduces to that of Varian
(1980). Using similar arguments as in Varian (1980) and Narasimhan (1988), we can show that
no pure-strategy equilibrium exists in the subgame that starts at stage 2. There is, however,
a symmetric mixed-strategy equilibrium in which both retailers have equal market shares and
offer randomly chosen prices to the consumers. Let Gij(P ) denote the probability that retailer j,
where j = 1, 2, sets a price higher than P for consumer type Vi, where i = `, h. For example,
Gh1(P ) = Prob(P1(V
h) ≥ P ) where P1(V h) is the price offered by D1 to consumer type V h. Since
the equilibrium we consider is symmetric, both dealers adopt the same price distribution, Gi(P ),
for each consumer type.
Lemma 1 (i) The manufacturer optimally sets W o = V `.
(ii) In equilibrium, each retailer charges V ` to low-type consumers and randomly chooses a price
from the interval [V `, V h] for the high-type consumers, with Gh(P ) = αu+αp2(1−αu−αp )
(
V h−P
P−W
)
.
(iii) the expected profit of the manufacturer is pio = (αu + αp)λh(V h − V `) + V ` − δ.
The proof of this and all other results is in the Appendix. The market share of each retailer
amongst consumers with valuation i is simply one-half. Now, at stage 1, the manufacturer chooses
the maximum franchise fee such that the retailers earn a non-negative profit (else they will choose
to not participate). In accordance with prior literature (for example, Rey and Stiglitz, 1995; Iyer
1998), we assume the large manufacturer wields bargaining power over the small retailers, who earn
a reservation profit of zero.7 Therefore, the optimal franchise fee charged by the manufacturer is
equal to the profit of each retailer, i.e.,
F =
αu + αp
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` − V `)− δ(1− αu
2
− αp
2
).
Thus total channel profits are equal to
2F +W = (αu + αp) λH (V
h − V `) + V ` − δ(2− αu − αp). (1)
Moorthy (1987) showed that in a channel, a simple contract (i.e., two-part tariff) consisting
of a fixed fee and a variable wholesale price is sufficient for coordination. For the manufacturer,
7If, retailers had a positive reservation profit, R, the equilibrium franchise fee would be F =
αu+αp
2
(λHV
h +
λLV
` −W )− δ(1− αu
2
− αp
2
)−R. In later sections, this implies that the manufacturer and infomediary capture all
the gains from increased channel profits. If the retailers also had some bargaining power, we would expect them to
share in such gains.
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coordination in distribution channels means designing a contract which (1) maximizes the total
channel profits and (2) transfers the profits at the retail level back to the manufacturer. A vertically
integrated manufacturer selling directly offline, would accrue total profits equal to
λHV
h + λLV
` − δ = λH (V h − V `) + V ` − δ. (2)
This expression represents the maximum achievable channel profits offline. From a comparison
of the profits under the integrated and the decentralized system, i.e., equations (1) and (2), it is
immediate that the two part-tariff is unable to achieve channel coordination since αu + αp < 1.
4 Model with Referral Infomediary
Next, we consider a model in which a referral infomediary enrols one retailer (specifically, D2), and
enables some consumers to obtain an online price from this retailer. There are now four stages to
the game. In stage 1, the manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F and wholesale price W . In stage 2,
the referral infomediary enrolls D2, and sets a referral fee, K. In stage 3, retailers simultaneously
choose prices: D1 chooses (P1(V
h), P1(V
`)), as before, and D2 chooses (P2(V
h), P2(V
`)) for offline
consumers, and P r
2
for online consumers (who access the retailer via the referral infomediary).
Finally, consumers decide which retailer to buy from.
As before, αu obtain just one offline price, and visit the two retailers in equal proportion. αp
consumers obtain an offline price from D1, and an online price from D2. Since their online price
comes from D2, they visit D1 for an offline price. Thus each retailer now has a captive segment
of size αu2 while a proportion αp of the population see two prices, (P
r
2
, P1(V
h)) or (P r
2
, P1(V
`)),
depending upon their types Vi. Fully informed consumers obtain an offline price from each retailer,
as well as an online price from D2. The prices observed by consumers in different market segments
are depicted in Figure 2. Note the difference with the model with no infomediary: offline consumers
still obtain a price that depends on type, but online consumers receive a price independent of type.
Types αu2
αu
2 αp 1− αu − αp
HV Consumers P1(V
h) P2(V
h) P1(V
h), P r
2
P1(V
h), P2(V
h), P r
2
LV Consumers P1(V
`) P2(V
`) P1(V
`), P r
2
P1(V
`), P2(V
`), P r
2
Figure 2: Prices observed by each consumer segment when Infomediary enters
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Retailers are now asymmetric in terms of the number of consumers who observe their prices.
This model, therefore, builds on Narasimhan (1988), who considers asymmetric firms. Further,
D2 can now quote more than one price to consumers in fully informed segment, allowing for price
discrimination across segments. The model in this section is similar to CIP (2002), but with the
multiple differences outlined in the Introduction.
Assumption 1 λh ≤ V `V h .
If the proportion of high-value consumers is very high, the retailers will find it optimal to ignore
the low-value consumers, and sell only to the high-value consumers. In particular, the manufacturer
will charge W = V h in the case that δ = 0, or W as high as possible (but below V h) when δ is
positive. Define this latter value to be W¯ . For λH high enough, this will involve W > V
`, so no
low-value consumers will be served. However, the more interesting case of our model is that both
types of consumers are served.
Notice also that it cannot be optimal for the manufacturer to charge any W ∈ (V `, W¯ ), since
again the low-value consumers will be shut out of the market (since retailers will charge a price
no lower than W ). Hence, consider the choice of W in the region [0, V `]. The equilibrium here
depends on whether the manufacturer chooses a low wholesale price (closer to zero) or a high one
(closer to V `). For ease of comparison throughout the paper, we consider the choice among prices
sufficiently close to V `. In particular, we show that there is a threshold value of W (which we call
Wˆ ) such that the equilibrium strategies of the dealers for any wholesale price W ∈ [Wˆ , V `] can
be described in terms of W . This then allows us to determine the optimal wholesale price in this
region.
We first exhibit the equilibrium that obtains if the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price in
the range [Wˆ , V `]. Later, we argue that this choice is optimal.
Proposition 1 There exists a wholesale price Wˆ < V ` with the following property: Suppose the
manufacturer chooses a wholesale price W ∈ [Wˆ , V `]. Then, there is an equilibrium in which
(i) P2(V
h) = V h, and the prices P1(V
h) and P r
2
are randomly chosen from [Pˆ h, V h] where Pˆ h =
W + αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu ) . Further, G
r
2
(P ) = αu (V
h−P )
2(1−αu )(P−W ) and G
h
1(P ) =
αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu )(P−W ) , with a mass point at
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V h equal to αu2−αu .
(ii) the prices P1(V
`) and P2(V
`) are randomly chosen from [Pˆ `, V `], where Pˆ ` =W+ (αu+2αp )(V
`−W )
2−αu .
The price distributions satisfy G`1(P ) =
Pˆ `−W
P−W − αu2(1−αu−αp )
P−Pˆ `
P−W , with a mass point at V
` equal
to 2αp2−αu , and G
`
2(P ) =
αu+2αp
2(1−αu−αp )
V `−P
P−W .
(iii) D2 has a higher gross profit than D1.
The entry of the referral infomediary leads to an increase in competition between the two
retailers. In equilibrium, D2 uses the infomediary as a price discriminating mechanism. Essentially,
D2 now has two weapons: it uses P r2 to compete with D1, and P2(V
h) and P2(V
`) to capture the
entire consumer surplus from its captive uninformed segment. The online infomediary referral price,
P r
2
, is therefore used to discriminate between uninformed and informed consumers.
This result shows that by strategically choosing the wholesale price the manufacturer is able
to enforce an equilibrium which gives it higher profits. Note that prior literature has shown that
setting a per unit fee equal to the manufacturer’s marginal cost (which is zero in our model) can
maximize manufacturer and channel profits. However, we show that this policy does not hold in the
case when retailers can price discriminate among consumers. In particular, setting a lower wholesale
price leads to lower prices on an average, as retailers end up competing fiercely. Conversely, setting
a higher wholesale price alleviates the extent of price competition between downstream retailers.
In equilibrium D1 makes all its sales at its physical store. This includes a portion
λ
H
αu
2 made
at V h to the high valuation consumers in the uninformed segment, a portion λLαu2 made at V
`
to the low valuation consumers in the uninformed segment and a portion λL(
1−αu+αp
2 ) made at
V ` to the low valuation consumers in the partially and fully informed segments. Using P1(V
h), it
also makes sales λH (
(1−αu )2
2−αu ), to the high valuation consumers in the partially and fully informed
segments. D2 makes some online sales, λH (
1−αu
2−αu ), at the referral price, P
r
2
, in the partially and fully
informed segments, and some offline sales λL(
1−αu−αp
2 ) to the low valuation segments, in these two
segments. Further, it makes some sales at its physical store in the uninformed segment (λHαu2 and
λ
L
αu
2 , respectively, to the high and low valuation consumers in this segment). Thus the “reach” of
the infomediary is equal 1− αu , the sum of the partially and fully informed segments.
Sales made through the online referral mechanism incur no acquisition cost. However for every
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customer who walks in at the physical stores, retailers incur an acquisition cost of δ. The gross
profit of D2 (i.e., without accounting for the franchise and referral fees) is higher than that of D1
due to three reasons: (i) there is a reallocation in its total sales (ii) its acquisition costs decrease
since some consumers shift online, and (iii) its ability to price discriminate improves, and it can
charge a monopoly price to the uninformed segment.
In equilibrium, the manufacturer will set its franchise fee, F , equal to the lower of the two gross
profits, that is, the expected gross profit of D1. The optimal referral fee charged by the infomediary
will be the difference in profits between D2 and D1.
Hence, in equilibrium, the manufacturer chooses a wholesale price W ≥ Wˆ , rather than any
price less than Wˆ . WhenW < Wˆ , the profit of D1 decreases since prices (P1(V
h), P1(V
`)) decrease
(due to aggravated price competition). Notice this occurs because with a reduction inW , the lower
bound (Pˆ h, Pˆ `) both decrease, thereby reducing the average prices. This leads to a reduction in
the franchise fee. Further, it is immediate to see that since the market size is fixed, profits from
the per unit wholesale price component decreases too. Since the manufacturer’s profits are equal
to 2F +W , total manufacturer profits are lower when W < Wˆ.
Given the equilibrium, we can now determine the sales and profit of each retailer. The su-
perscripts m and I on expected profits, franchise and referral fees, denote the scenarios with and
without manufacturer referral services. In equilibrium, when choosing from prices in the range
[Wˆ , V `], the manufacturer again sets W = V `. Then, the total channel profits are given by
2F I +W +KI = (
αu(3− 2αu)
2− αu
)(λH (V
h − V `)) + V ` − δ(2− αu − αp). (3)
Proposition 2 Suppose (1− αu − 2αpλL) > 0. Then,
(i) The optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer is W I = V `. This choice of W also maximizes
total channel profits.
(ii) The optimal franchise and referral fees, respectively, are
F I = λH (V
h − V `) (αu2 )− δ(1− αu2 ).
KI = λH αu (1−αu )2−αu (V
h − V `) + αp δ.
This choice of W goes some way towards channel coordination; total manufacturer and channel
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profits are maximized. However, since the infomediary is a competing third-party, the manufacturer
cannot really extract all of the infomediary’s profit. Even if the manufacturer adjusts the wholesale
price to eliminate any advantage that the infomediary-enrolled retailer has due to price discrimi-
nation, it cannot eliminate acquisition costs that accrue in the offline channel. Consequently, the
infomediary-enrolled retailer will benefit from enrollment and the infomediary will continue to sur-
vive, no matter how the manufacturer adjusts the two-part tariff. As a result, the manufacturer will
be unable to extract all the channel profits. Thus this highlights that in the presence of third-party
referral services, a two-part tariff is able to achieve only partial channel coordination.
Consider the condition (1−αu−2αpλL) > 0 in the statement of Proposition 2. In the absence of
the infomediary, by setting the wholesale price at V `, the manufacturer is able to prevent aggravated
price competition between the retailers. This occurs because when W = V `, the upper and lower
bounds of the retailers’ price distributions P1(V
`) and P2(V
`), collapse to a single monopoly price
point of V `. This helps both the retailers to extract the whole consumer surplus from the low
valuation consumers, even in the partially and fully informed segments. While this phenomenon
still occurs in the presence of the infomediary, the wholesale price is set to V ` only if the proportion
of partially informed consumers or low valuation consumers is reasonably low. For instance, for any
λL ≤ 0.5, the optimality of this wholesale price will hold. In a similar manner if αu+2αp increases,
then it is immediate to see from the expression for Pˆ ` that the interval over which prices are being
randomized for the low valuation consumers by both firms decreases. That is, price competition
between the retailers is alleviated. Consequently, the manufacturer can now afford to decrease the
wholesale price.
In sum, the presence of the infomediary leads to an increase in the gross profit of the enrolled
retailer, and a corresponding decrease in the gross profit of the other retailer. This, in turn, leads
to a lower franchise fee, and a decrease in the profits of the manufacturer. As a response to this,
the manufacturer establishes its own referral services. As we show below this strategic decision
leads to an increase in the profits of the manufacturer.
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5 Manufacturer Establishes a Referral Service
Finally, we consider the scenario in which the manufacturer sets up its own referral website, in
response to the presence of the infomediary. This game is derived from the previous game (which
had the infomediary; see Figure 2 above) as follows. We assume that the manufacturer enrolls both
retailers, such that at each of the four terminal nodes in Figure 2, a proportion β of the consumers
(the “physical segment”) continue to visit the physical stores, while the remaining proportion, 1−β
(the “web segment”), go to the corresponding retailer via the manufacturer referral website. Later,
we highlight why the manufacturer is content enrolling both retailers rather than just enrolling D1,
the retailer not enrolled with the infomediary.
The stages in this game are as follows: In stage 1, the manufacturer sets the franchise fee, F ,
the wholesale price W , and establishes a referral web site. In stage 2, the referral infomediary
enrolls D2, and sets a referral fee, K. Then in stage 3, retailers simultaneously choose prices. D1
chooses (P1(V
h), P1(V
`)) for offline consumers, and Pm
1
for online consumers who come through the
manufacturer web site. D2 chooses (P2(V
h), P2(V
`)) for offline consumers, Pm
2
for online consumers,
who come via the manufacturer web site, and P r
2
for online consumers who come via the referral
infomediary. In the final stage, consumers decide which product to buy.
In terms of the stages, we allow the manufacturer to move first to capture the notion that it
has significant market power, and can establish its franchise fee to capture rents from the dealers.
The infomediary has less market power, and is, in a sense, the residual claimant on the profit of
D2.8 The prices seen by consumers in different market segments are shown in Figure 3.
Types βαu2
(1−β)αu
2
βαu
2
(1−β)αu
2 βαp (1−β)αp β(1−αu−αp ) (1−β)(1−αu−αp )
HV P1 (V h) Pm1 P2 (V h) Pm2 P1 (V h),P r2 P
m
1
,P r
2 P1 (V
h),P2 (V
h),P r
2
Pm
1
,Pm
2
,P r
2
LV P1 (V `) Pm1 P2 (V `) Pm2 P1 (V `),P r2 P
m
2
,P r
2 P1 (V
`),P2 (V
`),P r
2
Pm
1
,Pm
2
,P r
2
Figure 3: Different prices observed by each consumer segment
Each retailer continues to observe the type of the consumer at the physical store (i.e., in each
of the four sub-segments of the physical segment β), and can quote a price to these consumers that
depends on their type. However, the retailers do not observe the types of the consumers who come
8The timing of the web site setup is not critical; we could alternatively have a stage 2.5 above, at which the
manufacturer sets up its web site. In equilibrium, this will be anticipated by all players, and the fees set accordingly.
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via the manufacturer web site. Hence, in the web (1 − β) sub-segments, the same prices must be
quoted to both consumer types by a given retailer. We denote the online (manufacturer referral)
prices of the two retailers as Pm
1
and Pm
2
.
In equilibrium, the price offered by D2 to consumers who use the infomediary, P r2 , follows
the same distribution as before, in Proposition 1, in the world with only an infomediary and no
manufacturer referrals. Consider the extreme case with only web consumers (i.e., β = 0). The
structure of the game is then similar to the one with only an infomediary referral service. However
since all consumers here are online, no information about consumer valuations is available. Since
the proportion of high valuation consumers is low, both retailers act as if all consumers had low
valuations and set a highest price of V `, while randomizing prices in the partially and fully informed
segments. Hence Gr
2
(P ) remains the same as in Proposition 1.
This property then helps determine the rest of the equilibrium strategies. In particular, given
the structure of the new game, it implies that the prices P1(V
`), P1(V
h), P2(V
`), P2(V
h) are set
as in the earlier game. Finally, Pm
1
is chosen randomly over an interval as well. The equilibrium
exhibited below holds for all values of β ∈ [0, 1]. Note that, if β = 1, we are back to the game of
Figure 2, and the strategies shown below are equivalent to those in Proposition 1 (since Gm
1
(P ) is
not relevant when β = 1).
Just as the equilibrium in Proposition 1 is valid when W ≥ Wˆ , the equilibrium exhibit below
is valid when W ≥ Wˆm, where Wˆm is a sufficiently high wholesale price. Again, Wˆm is implicitly
defined, given a no-deviation condition for D2.
Proposition 3 There exists a wholesale price Wˆm < V ` with the following property: Suppose the
manufacturer chooses a wholesale price W ∈ [Wˆm, V `]. Then, there is an equilibrium in which:
(i) P1(V
`), P1(V
h), P2(V
`), P2(V
h) and P r
2
are set exactly as in Proposition 1,
(ii) Pm
2
= V h, and Pm
1
is randomly chosen over [Pˆ h, V h], where Pˆ h = W + αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu ) . Further,
Gm
1
(P ) = αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu )(P−W ) , with a mass point at V
h equal to αu2−αu .
Notice that the expected infomediary referral price of D2 is lower than its walk-in prices P2(V
h)
or the manufacturer referral price Pm
2
. There are two countervailing effects here. First, there is
the price discrimination aspect: P r
2
is used as a competitive tool against D1. Second, there is a
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loss of information about consumer willingness to pay on the Internet. This prevents the retailer
from practising online price discrimination based on consumer valuations. These two effects act
in tandem with each other and bring down the infomediary referral prices. However, retailers also
gain from the fact that there is a potential savings in the acquisition cost per online customer.
We point out that there exists a critical value of β, βˆ beyond which the manufacturer will choose
W > Wˆ . Intuitively, when the manufacturer chooses a higher wholesale price, retailers are forced
to raise the minimum value of Pm
1
higher than V `. Consequently the low valuation buyers who
check online prices in the web segment are shut out off the market. Hence, depending on the
proportion of consumers who check manufacturer referral prices, the manufacturer may chose a
lower wholesale price. When β → 1, that is, when the proportion of consumers in the “physical
segment” becomes higher, the manufacturer chooses a higher W . Intuitively, with fewer consumers
seeing the manufacturer’s online prices, retailers are aware that they can price discriminate in the
offline channels, without the fear of losing any of the low types. This enables the manufacturer to
raise the wholesale price. Similarly, when λH → 1, that is, when the proportion of higher valuation
consumers increases, the optimal wholesale price is higher than Wˆ . The intuition is similar: When
the proportion of high type consumers in the market is sufficiently high, retailers’ profits from the
high types by charging a higher Pm
1
(only the high types buy when Pm
1
> V `) is more than their loss
from shutting out the low types. Consequently, the manufacturer can afford to raise its wholesale
price.
In order to make analogous comparisons with the case when there are no manufacturer referral
services, here onwards we focus on the equilibrium when the manufacturer chooses a wholesale
price W ≥ Wˆm.
Proposition 4 In equilibrium, the retailers’ expected sales, prices, and profits in the physical seg-
ment are the same as in Proposition 1. In the web segment,
(i) the retailers’ expected sales are E(Sm1 ) = λH (
1
2−αu −
αu
2 ), E(S
m
2 ) = λH
(
1−αu
2−αu +
αu
2
)
.
(ii) The expected prices are:
E(Pm
1
) =
4W (1− α
u
)2 + α
u
(2− α
u
)V h + 2α
u
(1− α
u
) (ln 2−αuαu ) (V
h −W )
(2− αu)2
E(P r
2
) = W +
αu (ln
2−αu
αu
) (V h −W )
2(1− αu)
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(iii) the retailers’ expected gross profits from the segment are
E(p˜im1 ) = (1− β) λH
αu
2
(V h −W )
E(p˜im2 ) = (1− β) λH
αu
2
4− 3αu
2− α
u
(V h −W )
We observe that the expected price E(P r
2
) increases with the size of the captive segment αu (the
increase is close to linear for higher values of αu). An increase in the size of the captive segment
αu implies a decrease in the reach of the referral service (there are fewer consumers in the partially
and fully informed segments, the segments that use the infomediary). This increase in the captive
uninformed segment of D1 provides it an incentive to increase its online price, Pm1 . Now, D2 can
utilize this fact to its advantage by increasing its infomediary referral price, P r
2
. It is still able to
compete successfully with D1 in the partially and fully informed segments, thus increasing its profit.
After the manufacturer adopts its own referral service, D2 still retains an advantage over D1, both
in terms of expected sales and gross profits (recall that these are the profits before the franchise fee
and infomediary fee are subtracted out). However this advantage is considerably reduced, resulting
in lower referral fees for the infomediary. Notice that when αu = 1, E(Pm1 ) and E(P1(V
h)) are
both equal to V h. If all consumers are uninformed, then the retailers can charge monopoly prices
to these captive consumers. We state the following corollary without proof (a proof is immediate
from Proposition 4).
Corollary 4.1 (i) In equilibrium, with the introduction of the manufacturer referral service, the
retailer associated with the infomediary, D2, has higher expected sales and gross profits in the web
segment. However, in the physical segment, the sales of each retailer remain the same even after
the introduction of the manufacturer referral service.
(ii) The average manufacturer referral prices are higher than the average infomediary referral prices.
In the physical segments, the market shares of the two retailers remain the same as in the world
with an infomediary, but no manufacturer referrals. However in the web segments, on comparing
the performance of D2 when it enrolls with the infomediary to that of D1, we see that it experiences
a higher market share. Hence, there is a strong incentive for D2 (or more generally, for any one
retailer) to enroll with the infomediary. An affiliation with the referral infomediary provides the
18
retailer with the ability to price discriminate in its uninformed (captive) segment. It charges a
monopoly price to all offline consumers, and uses the referral price to compete with the other
retailer online. This increases its expected sales. Conversely, the retailer who remains out of the
infomediary referral services incurs a significant loss in expected sales and profits.
Recall that Gh1(P ) has a positive mass at V
h which is exactly the same as that of Gm
1
(P ).
So that the expected sales of each retailer remain the same irrespective of manufacturer referral
services. Since neither retailer wants to shut out the high valuation buyers, they do not charge
more than V h to online consumers. This is equivalent to assuming that all consumers have a high
valuation. Therefore, since Gr
2
(P ) follows the same distribution, we get the result that expected
sales remain the same even with the entry of the manufacturer referral service.
Superficially, manufacturer and infomediary referrals are similar in that they put a customer in
contact with a particular retailer. The difference between the two types of referral prices predicted
by our model is consistent with empirical evidence found by Scott-Morton et al.(2003b). They
find that while the referral process of third-party infomediaries helps consumers get lower prices,
a referral from a manufacturer website to one of the manufacturer’s dealerships does not help
consumers obtain a lower price.
In equilibrium, the manufacturer again sets the franchise fee, F , so that the retailer with lower
sales, D1, makes a zero profit. The infomediary then sets its fee, K, to capture the remaining profit
of D2. Further, we show that for any value of the offline acquisition cost δ, the manufacturer makes
a higher profit when it offers its own referral web site.
Define X = (αu + 2αp).
Proposition 5 If (1− αuλH − βλLX) > 0,
(i) the optimal wholesale price for the manufacturer is W I = V `.
(ii) the optimal franchise and referral fees, respectively, are
Fm = βF I + (1− β)λH (αu2 )(V h − V `).
Km = βKI + (1− β)λH αu (1−αu )(2−αu ) (V
h − V `).
(iii) the manufacturer earns a higher profit by opening up its own referral web site.
Consider the effects of the manufacturer referral service on the infomediary profit. Notice first that
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Km is always positive, for any value of δ. Secondly, when β = 1, this is exactly equal to KI . As
β decreases to zero (i.e., more consumers shop online), Km decreases while Fm increases. Thus as
the manufacturer is able to divert more traffic onto online channels, its profit increases while that
of the infomediary decreases. Since the rate of increase in manufacturer profit is higher than the
rate of decrease in infomediary profit, the total channel profits increase.9
Note that when β = 0, (that is, if all consumers were to search for prices on the online channels)
the condition for the optimal wholesale price to be V ` always holds since (1 − αuλH ) > 0. In a
similar vein, if β = 1, that is all consumers shift offline, (1−αuλH−βλLX) reduces to 1−αu−2λLαp
as expected. This implies that for any β ∈ (0, 1), the wholesale price will be set to V ` for a much
bigger region in the parameter space than the case when there is only an infomediary referral
service. Thus the establishment of a referral service by the manufacturer enables it to respond to
the entry of an infomediary, by giving itself a wider leeway to set the unit fee to the earlier profit
maximizing level.
However for any value of δ, there is a reallocation of channel profits from the referral infomediary
to the manufacturer, after the manufacturer introduces its own referral service. This results in
higher manufacturer profits than in a world with only infomediary referral service.
Proposition 6 There exists a critical value of acquisition cost, δˆ, such that for any δ larger than
δˆ, the channel profits under a two-part tariff exceed the channel profits achievable offline under a
vertically integrated manufacturer.
Recall equation (2) which gives the channel profits if the manufacturer were to sell directly. We
show that when, the manufacturer’s two part tariff can result in higher profits than those accrued
under a direct selling manufacturer. From Proposition 5, the total channel profits 2Fm+W+Km =
(
αu(3− 2αu)
2− αu
)(λH (V
h − V `)) + (1− β)λHV ` − βδ(2− αu − αp). (4)
Compare this to equation (2). Notice that when β = 0 for instance, then channel profits with the
two-part tariff can be higher than those achieved under a centralized system. In sum, savings from
customer acquisition costs online, can enable a decentralized manufacturer achieve higher channel
9This follows from the fact that ∂F
m
∂β
= δ (1− αu
2
) > ∂K
m
∂β
= δ αp .
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profits than those achieved through direct selling.
However, if acquisition cost savings are not high enough, then an alternate strategy for manu-
facturers is to invest in technologies which can facilitate price discrimination online for customers
visiting their referral services. The upshot of losing information about consumer valuations online
is that manufacturer referral prices are higher than V `. This results in a proportion (1 − β)λL of
the consumers shut out from the market. If D1 could identify consumers and set a price Pm1 based
on their valuations, it would result in increased sales from the low valuation customers. While the
franchise fees and referral fees would remain unchanged, it would lead to higher manufacturer and
channel profits, by an amount equal to V `(1− β)λL . This increase would accrue from the per-unit
fee component of the two-part tariff. Thus online price discrimination can lead to even higher
profits than those attainable in a vertically integrated manufacturer.
If all consumers who shift online are the high valuation customers, then the manufacturer gains
even more by establishing its own referral service. We can show that in such a scenario, the optimal
franchise and referral fees can be written as
Fm
∗
=
(1− βλL)
λH
F I +
(1− β)δ
λH
(1− αu
2
) (5)
Km
∗
=
(1− βλL)
λH
KI − (1− β)αpδ
λH
.
From this the total channel profits 2Fm
∗
+W +Km
∗
=
(1− βλL)
λH
(
αu(3− 2αu)
2− αu
)(λH (V
h − V `)) + V ` − βδ(2− αu − αp). (6)
Compare this to equation (4). Notice that since β < 1 we have (1−βλL )λ
H
> 1. Hence, Fm
∗
> Fm
and Km
∗
> Km.
The impetus toward an increased manufacturer profit comes from two sources. First, it levels the
playing field between the two retailers by providing D1 with a weapon to price discriminate between
consumer segments online. Using the manufacturer’s referral price Pm
1
, D1 is now able to compete
more effectively against D2’s infomediary referral price P r2 for the partially and fully informed
consumer segments. Second, there is a reduction in D′1s acquisition costs as some consumers are
served online. This increases profit in the channel, and enables the manufacturer to extract this
increased profit via an increase in the franchise fee that it charges the retailers. Since eventual profits
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of each retailer are non-negative, there is no conflict of interest here between channel members. Thus
the strategic decision by the manufacturer to adopt an online referral service affects both channel
profits achievable and the allocation of profits among channel members.
5.1 Eliminating the Referral Infomediary
Is it possible for the manufacturer to drive the third-party infomediary out of the market? Rather,
the more pertinent question is whether the manufacturer should try to do that? Recall that the
infomediary’s referral fee consists of two components, which creates an incentive for a retailer to
enroll with the infomediary: (i) benefit from price discrimination and (ii) benefit from acquisition
cost savings. Even if the manufacturer is willing to compensate retailers for all the acquisition costs
incurred by them, i.e., δ = 0, the referral fee still remains positive due to the price discrimination
component. Hence, the infomediary will survive. Similarly, even if the wholesale price was strate-
gically set to V h, the referral fee would still be positive, due to the acquisition cost component.
Hence, the only strategy for a manufacturer whose objective is to eliminate a third-party referral
service, can adopt is a simultaneous two-pronged attack: (i) absorb all the acquisition costs and
(ii) offer a wholesale price set to the valuation of the high type customer. Either one on its own
is ineffective in unravelling the infomediary. Of course, this strategy comes at a price: both the
manufacturer and channel profits are substantially lower. This implies that the manufacturer is
content keeping the infomediary in business.
Types βαu2
(1−β)αu
2
βαu
2
(1−β)αu
2 βαp (1−β)αp β(1−αu−αp ) (1−β)(1−αu−αp )
HV P1 (V h) Pm1 P2 (V h) Pm2 P1 (V h) Pm1 ,Pm2 P1 (V h),P2 (V h) Pm1 ,Pm2
LV P1 (V `) Pm1 P2 (V `) Pm2 P1 (V `) Pm1 ,Pm2 P1 (V `),P2 (V `) Pm1 ,Pm2
Figure 4: Different prices observed by each consumer segment
Proposition 7 There exists a critical value of β such that given the presence of its own referral
service, the manufacturer benefits from the presence of the competing referral infomediary.
In fact, we find that for a wide range in the parameter space, the manufacturer even benefits
from the presence of the infomediary, once it has established its own referral service. Refer Figure
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4.10 Basically the infomediary’s referral price P r
2
prevents the enrolled retailer, D2 from spiralling
into aggravated price competition with D1, by creating sufficient differentiation in consumers’search
behavior. In particular, the presence of the infomediary make D2 asymmetric and stronger com-
pared to D1. This happens because D2 now has two online pricing tools: one via the manufacturer
referral (Pm
2
) and the other via the infomediary referral (P r
2
). In contrast, D1 only has one online
pricing tool, that from the manufacturer referral service, (Pm
1
). Consequently this asymmetry in
the availability of online pricing tools, leads to higher prices on an average for the manufacturer
referral prices of both retailers as well as for the high valuation consumers who come offline. Hence,
the manufacturer might not want to strategically eliminate the infomediary.
5.2 Manufacturer Enrols Only One Retailer
It can be argued that the manufacturer’s referral service by enrolling both retailers, indiscrimi-
nately skims off a fraction of all consumers. Hence, prima facie it is unclear that differences in
performance/conduct do not arise from this mechanical asymmetry between the manufacturer’s
referral service and the infomediary referral service. In order to alleviate this concern, we consider
the scenario when the manufacturer enrolls only one retailer, say D1.11 The resultant consumer
search schema is shown in Appendix B. We state the following corollary.
Corollary 7.1 The manufacturer is equally better off enrolling only D1 as it is by enrolling both
retailers.
For brevity we avoid the math but provide the intuition here. Notice from the schema in the
Appendix B, that in the absence of D2 being enrolled by the manufacturer, the two segments which
get affected are the uninformed (captive) segment of D2 and the fully informed consumers in the
β segment. While the former does not impact profits of D1 in any way, it is presumable that the
latter might do so. However, recall that Pm
2
was priced at V h, whereas Pm
1
and P r
2
were randomized
between (Pˆ h, V h). Consequently, D1 was effectively competing only D′2 infomediary referral price,
P r
2
and not with D′2s manufacturer referral price, Pm2 . Hence, the absence of P
m
2
does not affect
10Notice that when β = 1, this reduces to exactly the set up in Figure 1.
11It is trivial to show that enrolling only D2, leads to a further decrease in D
′
1s profits and results in lower
manufacturer profits.
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the profits of D1 in any way and thus leaves the manufacturer’s profits unchanged. However it does
affect D′2s profits. In fact it increases D′2s profits by not enrolling it because in the captive segment
D2 can now sell to low valuation consumers offline using P2(V `), rather than losing a proportion
β of them online. But since the increase in profits of D2 is captured by the infomediary, it leaves
D′2s net profits unchanged. In turn, this provides the manufacturer another incentive to decrease
the infomediary’s channel power.
This result reconciles itself very well with practice. Manufacturers like GM, Nissan and Ford
follow a non-exclusive strategy of enrolling retailers in their referral services like GMbuypower.com,
Nissandriven.com and Forddirect.com.12 One reason for adopting this strategy could be to avoid
negative ramifications from the Robinson-Patman Act.13 Our model also provides an alternate
rationale as to why a manufacturer may follow the non-exclusive practice of enrolling both retailers
unlike a third-party infomediary which practices exclusivity.
5.3 Closing Ratios of Referral Services
In equilibrium, the number of online quotes provided to consumers exceeds the total number of
sales via online referrals. A referral is not costless, since responding to an online request entails
an investment in time for a retailer. A standard measure of sales efficiency in this context is the
Closing Ratio (CR), defined as follows
CR = Number of units soldNumber of referrals received
A low closing ratio would imply an inability to convert referrals into sales, further suggesting
high costs and low profits. This statistic also forms a pivotal basis on which a retailer is evaluated
by the referral infomediary, thereby ensuring the viability of the referral institution. For example,
in 1998-99, Autobytel dropped around 250 dealers (10% of its dealer base) because of negative
customer feedback and low closing ratios (see Moon, 2000). Table 1 shows the closing ratio for
the different price quotes offered by retailers to the pure online, that is, the (1 − β) segments.
Comparing the online closing ratios for the retailers, we find that D2 has a higher closing ratio for
12Clicking on the link to find a dealership on the Volvo design-and-build site, gets customers three dealer options,
all with e-mail contacts.
13This Act prohibits manufacturers from discriminating between retailers unless explained by cost differences.
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infomediary referrals than D1 for manufacturer referrals. This reflects the ability of D2 to price
discriminate online as well, since this retailer obtains referrals via both the manufacturer and the
infomediary.
Price Quote Expected Sales No. of Referrals C.R.
D1 manufacturer referral λH (
1
2−αu −
αu
2 ) 1− αu2
λ
H
((1−αu )2+1)
(2−αu )2
D2 manufacturer referral
λ
H
αu
2 1− αu2 − αp
λ
H
αu
2−αu−2αp
D2 infomediary referral (with manf. referral) λH (
1−αu
2−αu ) (1− αu)
λ
H
2−α1
D2 infomediary referral (w/o manf referral) E(SI1)− αu2 (1− αu)
E(SI1 )−
αu
2
(1−αu )
Anecdotal evidence suggests that, on the whole, manufacturer referral services experience a
higher closing ratios than infomediaries.14 For example, GM, has one of the highest closing ratios
in the referral business, greater than 20% while Microsoft CarPoint and AutoWeb have a CR of
between 12% and 19 %. However, Carsdirect.com has a higher closing ratio than any other service,
including the OEMs.
5.4 Numerical Corroboration with Anecdotal Evidence
We show in this subsection that, over a wide range of parameters, our model generates propositions
which are in accordance with anecdotal evidence. We discuss the parameter values used in this
corroboration, followed by their implications for δc,K, and closing ratios.
First, consider the sizes of the different market segments. Klein and Ford (2001) in their survey
of auto buyers point out that about 58% of consumers do not search at all. Additionally, about 22%
of the buyers, exhibit moderate search behavior by searching some of the offline and online sources
while about 20% are highly active information seekers who obtain multiple quotes from all possible
sources. This sort of consumer search behavior is corroborated by a J.D.Powers study, which finds
that about 41% of consumers surveyed used a referral service while buying a car, whereas the
remaining 59% did not.15 Based on these data sources, we vary the value of αu , the size of the
uninformed segment in our model, from zero to 0.5. Further, Ratchford, Lee and Talukdar (2002)
find that 40% of buyers used online sources (i.e., manufacturer and third-party websites). Based
on this we vary the β from 0.6 to 1.
14“Car Dealers Fumbling Web Potential,” www.ECommerceTimes.com, 06/21/01.
15“Microsoft CarPoint,” HBS Case study, August 2000.
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On acquisition costs, Scott-Morton, Zettelmeyer and Risso (2001) show that the average cost to
a dealer of an offline sale ($1,575) is $675 higher than the cost to a sale via Autobytel ($900). They
further mention a NADA study, which shows that a dealer’s average new car sales personnel and
marketing costs ($1,275) are reduced by $1,000 by virtue of sales through Internet referral services.
We vary the proportion of high valuation buyers, λH , from zero to 0.4. Based on actual average
gross margin of dealers (see Moon, 2000), we take (V h −W ) to be 3500 and (V ` −W ) to be 1500.
Using these ranges for the parameters, we compute δc, the critical value of the acquisition cost,
K, the infomediary referral fee, and closing ratios. We choose αu ∈ [0, 0.5]. We plot the critical
value, δc. If the actual acquisition cost, δ, lies above the line, the manufacturer’s profit increases
after it establishes its own referral service. We find that the maximal δc over this parameter range
is $700, close to the lower bound of empirically observed difference between offline and online
acquisition costs ($675–$1,000).
Next we consider the price differences between offline and online channels. Scott-Morton,
Zettelmeyer and Risso (2003a) show that the average Autobytel customer sees a contract price
about $500 less than the non-referral offline prices. For the parameters we consider, the difference
between the expected low valuation offline and the expected online infomediary referral price quotes
(for D2, the retailer associated with the infomediary), ranges between $400 and $650.
Finally, we numerically estimate the closing ratios of the referral services. We find that the
CR of D2 via manufacturer referral services ranges between 10% and 30%. According to anecdotal
evidence, Forddirect.com has a CR of 17% and GMBuypower.com has a CR of around 25%.16 The
numerical parameterization, therefore, highlights the robustness of the model and the main results.
The CR from the infomediary referral price in our model is between 20%−30%, slightly higher than
industry evidence.17 One reason for this may be that we do not consider inter-brand competition
in our model. If consumers search amongst multiple brands before completing a purchase, there
will be multiple referrals for a single sale, thereby resulting in lower closing ratios.
16www.trilogy.com/Sections/Industries/Automotive/Customers/FordDirect -Success-Story.cfm
17http://www.investorville.com/ubb/Forum2/HTML/000040.html
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6 Business Implications, Conclusions and Extensions
We present a model with multiple consumer types, multiple information structures and multiple
channels. We show that channel profits are a function of acquisition costs, heterogeneity in con-
sumer valuations and search behavior, retailers’ inter-channel price discrimination opportunities
and the wholesale price set by the manufacturer. While both third-party and manufacturer referral
services coexist today, anecdotal evidence suggests that infomediaries came into existence before
manufacturers established their own referral services. One goal of our paper is to provide some
insights into the evolvement of the current market structure.
Our analysis suggests that when manufacturers cannot directly sell to consumers, either due
to legal restrictions or to avoid “channel conflict” with their retailers, the online referral model
turns out to be a strategic tool for them to increase their channel power and profits. In particular,
the referral mechanism by diverting traffic from offline to online channels leads to a reduction
in retailers’ acquisition costs, and increases their ability to price discriminate by exploiting the
differences in consumers’ price search behavior, both in terms of the number of prices they see
and the channels (offline or online) in which the see them. The increase in profits happens despite
retailers having to forgo information about consumer valuations online.
Our model implies that the entry of third-party referral services have hurt manufacturers in
both components of its contract with retailers- reducing its franchisee fee and squeezing its optimal
wholesale price. Hence, the decision by a manufacturer to invest in its own online referral service,
increases its overall profits by increasing the franchise fee as well expanding the wholesale price
region which maximizes its profits. The extent to which overall profits increase depend on the
relative composition of consumer types in the market and their valuations. While in our model
the manufacturer captures this increase, we expect the actual allocation of profits among channel
members to vary, depending on the bargaining power of each agent.
Another implication of our model is that in markets with relatively inelastic market demand or
high brand loyalty, the optimal wholesale price to coordinate the channel can be higher than the
manufacturer’s marginal cost. In particular, in markets characterized by the presence of hetero-
geneity in consumer valuations, the manufacturer finds it optimal to set the wholesale price equal
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to the valuation of low type consumers, in order to alleviate price competition between downstream
retailers.
An interesting implication from our results is that once manufacturers have established their
referral services, it may be in their best interest to not strive to eliminate (or buy out) third-
party referral services. The competing infomediary referral services can actually helps rather than
necessarily hurt manufacturers, by preventing Bertrand pricing among manufacturer referral prices.
This in turn leads to higher profits for the manufacturer.
Finally, our results imply that in the presence of a competing third-party, a manufacturer
will be able to achieve full channel coordination using a two-part tariff only under either of two
circumstances: First, the manufacturer may be able to influence consumer search behavior in a
way that consumers increasingly visit manufacturer referral services. This could potentially be done
through heavy investments in advertising or strategic alliances with portals such as those of GM with
AOL and Ford’s with Yahoo. However, since infomediaries then might experience fewer customer
visits, these alliances need to be monitored carefully in order to prevent the infomediaries from
unravelling. This then hints at the fact that a manufacturer may prefer having an uncoordinated
channel in markets where there are competing infomediaries.
Second, if manufacturers invest in e-CRM packages to collect more information about consumers
who visit their referral services. This can enable their dealers to practice price discrimination online
by inferring consumer valuations. Increasingly, Nissan and GMBuypower.com also, are investing
in technologies to enable such personalized pricing initiatives online.18
CIP (2002) is the first study of the interesting and growing phenomenon of referral services for
retailers. This paper is an attempt at extending the insights gained from that paper, to understand
the implications of referral services for upstream players, i.e. manufacturers. One can think of
several extensions. For example, the model can be extended to the case in which the informed
segment decide to get both prices from the same retailer: its infomediary referral price and the
manufacturer referral price or walk-in price. Second, we could allow for a possibility of bargaining or
sequential search behavior amongst consumers. In this case, either a Bertrand equilibrium results,
with both retailers pricing at marginal cost, or, if retailers adopt a price-matching guarantee, they
18www-scf.usc.edu/ whalley/GMBuypower.txt
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can sustain a collusive outcome with prices equal to V `. A logical extension would be to examine
inter-brand competition with two manufacturers in the given set up. The increased upstream
competition might lead to both retailers garnering some of the channel profits, due to the enhanced
bargaining power arising from the threat of defection to the other manufacturer.
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7 Appendix
Details of some steps in the Proofs of Propositions 1 and 3 are available in the Technical Appendix
for Reviewers.
Proof of Lemma 1
First, suppose the manufacturer chooses some W ≤ V `.19 Suppose there is a symmetric equi-
librium, so that both retailers use the same strategy. We construct this strategy, and then show it
satisfies the required properties of an equilibrium.
Each retailer observes the type of each consumer, and hence charges a price contingent on this
type. If a retailer sold only to its monopoly segment, the optimal price to type i (i = `, h is just V i.
Now, suppose, for each retailer, Pmi (i = `, h) is randomly chosen over [Pˆi, P
m
i ]. Then, its profit
from consumer type i at any price in this interval must be the same, and must equal the profit at
price V i. Define γ = αu+αp2 (so that 1 − αu − αp = 1 − 2γ). At the price V i, a retailer sells only
to its captive segment, and its profit from consumer type i is λi γ (V
i −W ).
Suppose the mixed strategy has no mass points (the distribution we derive satisfies this prop-
erty). At some price P in the support of its mixed strategy, a retailer sells to its captive segment,
and also captures Gi(P ) of the competitive segment. Hence, its profit from consumer type i is
λi (γ +Gi(P )(1− 2γ)) (P −W ). Hence, (γ +Gi(P )(1− 2γ)) (P −W ) = γ (V i−W ). This implies
Gi(P ) = γ1−2γ (
V i−P
P−W ) (where
γ
1−2γ =
αu+αp
2(1−αu−αp )).
The lower bound on the support of the mixed strategy is found by setting Gi(Pˆ hi ) = 1, which
yields Pˆ hi =
1−2γ
1−γ W +
γ
1−γ V
i. Substituting for γ, we have Pˆ hi =
2(1−αu−αp )
2−αu−αp W +
αu+αp
2−αu−αp V
i.
Next, we show that this is an equilibrium. Note that Gi(Pm) = 0, so the mixed strategy has no
mass points. Consider retailer 1. For all prices P ∈ [Pˆ hi , Pmi ], retailer 1 earns the same profit from
consumer type i (by construction). If it charges P > Pmi , it loses all consumers of type i, leading
to a lower profit. If it charges P < Pˆ hi , it captures the same market share as at Pˆ
h
i , (1 − αu+αp2 ),
at a lower price. Hence, it makes a lower profit than at Pˆ hi . Therefore, retailer 1 has no profitable
deviation. By symmetry, neither does retailer 2. Hence, the strategies postulated constitute an
equilibrium.
Let gi = −dGidP . Note that the market share of each retailer is 12 (by symmetry). Hence, for each
retailer, the consumer acquisition cost is − δ2 . The expected profit of each retailer is
pi = λL
∫ V `
Pˆh
`
{
αu + αp
2
+ (1− αu − αp)G`(P )
}
(P −W ) g`(P )dP +
λH
∫ V h
Pˆh
h
{
αu + αp
2
+ (1− αu − αp)Gh(P )
}
(P −W ) gh(P ) dP − δ2 − F
=
αu + αp
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W )− δ
2
− F.
19Note that it cannot be optimal for the manufacturer to choose W > V `. The maximal channel profit in the latter
case is λhV
h. As long as λh is lower than
V `
V h
, this is not optimal.
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Now, the manufacturer’s profit is Πo = 2F +W = (αu + αp)(λHV
h + λLV
` −W ) − δ +W =
(αu + αp)(λHV
h + λLV
`) − δ + (1 − αu − αp)W . Since W ≤ V `, this is maximized at W ∗ = V `.
Substituting W = V ` into the equilibrium pricing and profit expressions derived above yields the
statement of the Lemma.
Proof of Proposition 1
The existence of a threshold wholesale price Wˆ is demonstrated in Step 2. First, we construct
mixed strategies for the players in terms of a generic wholesale price W , and in Step 2 demonstrate
that these constitute an equilibrium for W in the relevant range. At this step, requiring that D2
not make a higher profit by deviating to some other strategy imposes restrictions on the wholesale
price, which leads to an implicit definition of Wˆ .
Step 1 : Construction of mixed strategies.
Suppose the manufacturer charges some wholesale priceW . Consider P1(V
h), the price charged
by D1 to the high consumer type. In equilibrium, D1 should make the same profit by charging
any price P in the support of the mixed strategy as from charging a monopoly price V h. Hence,
αu
2 (P −W ) + (1− αu − αp + αp)(P −W )Gr2(P )− F = αu2 (V h −W )− F , which implies Gr2(P ) =
αu (V
h−P )
2(1−αu )(P−W ) .
Setting Gr
2
(P ) = 1 yields the lower bound of the support of the equilibrium strategy, Pˆ h =
W + αu (V
h−W )
2−αu . Note that this lower bound, Pˆ
h, must be the same for each firm. Suppose
Pˆ h1 < Pˆ
h
2 . Then, by charging Pˆ
h
1 +  (for some  ∈ (0, Pˆ h2 − Pˆ h1 )), D1 earns a higher profit than
from any price P ∈ (Pˆ h1 , Pˆ h1 + ). Hence, it cannot be an equilibrium to have Pˆ h1 < Pˆ h2 . By the
same logic, it cannot be that Pˆ h2 < Pˆ
h
1 , so it must be that Pˆ
h
1 = Pˆ
h
2 = Pˆ
h.
Now, for D2, the profit from any price P in the support of its mixed strategy P r2 should be equal
to that from charging the lower bound Pˆ h. First, note that the highest price that P r
2
will be set to is
V h. Further, in equilibrium P1(V
h) is being randomized. Hence, consumers of type V h who observe
P r
2
will buy either at P1(V
h) or at P r
2
. Therefore, λH (1−αu)(P −W )Gh1 = λH (1−αu)(Pˆ h−W )Gh1
which implies Gh1 =
(Pˆh−W )
(P−W ) =
αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu )(P−W ) .
Now, consider P2(V
h) and P2(V
`). Since P r
2
is always greater than V `, no consumer of type
V ` will buy at P r
2
. Hence, the equilibrium strategies for consumers of type V ` exactly parallel
those demonstrated by Narasimhan (1988). From this we can derive that the price distributions
satisfy G`1(P ) =
Pˆ `−W
P−W − αu2(1−αu−αp )
P−Pˆ `
P−W , with a mass point at V
` equal to 2αp2−αu , and G
`
2(P ) =
αu+2αp
2(1−αu−αp )
V `−P
P−W , where Pˆ
` =W + (αu+2αp )(V
`−W )
2−αu .
Step 2 : Checking no-deviation conditions given the above strategies.
Next, we prove that the conjectured strategies constitute an equilibrium. Since the details are
somewhat lengthy, this proof is provided in the Technical Appendix.
The threshold value ofW emerges from the no-deviation conditions forD2. SupposeD2 deviates
and chooses P2(V
`) = V `, P r
2
≤ V ` and P2(V h) = V h. Then, comparing its profit after deviation
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to its equilibrium profit, we find that the deviation is unprofitable if and only if
(1− αu)(Pˆ ` −W ) ≤ λH (1− αu)(Pˆ h −W ) + (1− αu − αp)λL(V ` −W )
2αu
(2− αu)
.
Clearly, if W = V `, the inequality above is strictly satisfied, since in this case Pˆ ` = V ` = W , and
the LHS is zero with the RHS strictly positive. Hence, for W sufficiently close to V `, it must be
satisfied as well. Solving the equality for W yields the threshold value Wˆ .
Step 3 : Determining expected profit for retailers.
We now proceed to derive the expected profit of each retailer when W ≥ Wˆ . Retailer D1 sells
to all of its captive segment, of size αu2 . In the other two segments, of size (1− αu), it sells to the
high consumer type, and only if P r
2
> P1(V
h), which happens with probability Gr2(P1(V
`)) at a
price P1(V
`). In the partially informed segment of size αp it sells to all the low type consumers.
In the fully informed segment of size 1− αu − αp , it sells to the low types only if P1(V `) < P2(V `)
which happens with the probability G`2(P1(V
`)). Therefore, the gross profit of retailer D1 (i.e.,
ignoring acquisition costs and the franchise fee) may be written as
pi1(P1(V
h), P1(V
`)) =
αu
2
(λHP1(V
h) + λLP1(V
`)−W ) + (7)
αp
(
λHG
r
2(P1(V
h)) (P1(V
h)−W ) + λL(P1(V `)−W )
)
+
(1− αu − αp)
(
λHG
r
2(P1(V
h)) (P1(V
h)−W ) + λLG`2(P1(V `)) (P1(V `)−W )
)
Substituting P1(V
h) = V h and P1(V
`) = V `, this reduces to
E(p˜ii1) =
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W ) + αpλL(V ` −W ). (8)
Suppose D2 chooses some prices P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`). For now, ignore acquisition costs and
franchise and referral fees—none of these terms change as the prices P r
2
, P2(V
h), P2(V
`) change.
Then, the gross profits for D2 can be written as follows.
pi2(P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`)) =
αu
2
(λHP2(V
h) + λLP2(V
`)−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (9)
αp
(
λHG
h
1
(P r
2
)(P r
2
−W ) + λLG`1(P r2 )(P r2 −W ) 1P r2≤V `
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (1− αu − αp)
(
λHG
h
1(min{P r2 , P2(V h)})(min{P r2 , P2(V h)} −W ) +
λLG
`
1(min{P r2 , P2(V `)})(min{P r2 , P2(V `)} −W )
)
The gross profit in equilibrium of D2 can be determined by substituting P r2 = V
h, P2(V
h) = V h,
and P2(V
`) = V ` (since any choice of P r
2
, P2(V
`) in the stated range leads to the same profit). This
leads to an equilibrium gross profit for D2 given by
E(p˜ii2) =
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+αp
(
αu
2− αu
)
λH (V
h −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+
+ (1− αu − αp)
(
λH
αu
2− αu
(V h −W ) + λL
2αp
2− αu
(V ` −W )
)
. (10)
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Hence, E(p˜ii2) > E(p˜i
i
1).
Proof of Proposition 2
The manufacturer optimally maximizes its franchise fee, subject to the condition that both dealers
must earn a non-negative expected profit (else they will exit the market). Let pii be the gross
profits of retailer i (that is, without subtracting off the franchise or infomediary fees). Then, in
equilibrium,
F ∗ = min{E(p˜ii1), E(p˜ii2)} =
αu
2
λH (V
h − V `)− δ(1− αu
2
).
Now, the infomediary sets the maximum referral fee at which D2 earns a non-negative profit. This
is defined by the K∗ at which E(p˜ii2)− F ∗ −K∗ = 0, or
K∗ = E(p˜ii2)− F ∗ =
λH αu(1− αu)
2− αu
(V h − V `) + αp δ.
Note that K∗ > 0 (since both terms are positive), which confirms that E(p˜ii1) < E(p˜ii2).
The total profits of the manufacturer 2F +W = αu λH (V
h −W ) + λL (αu + 2αp)(V ` −W ) +
W −δ(2−αu). This expression is increasing in W if (1−αu−2λLαp) > 0. Hence the manufacturer
should charge W as high as possible if (1−αu − 2λLαp) > 0. At W = V `, the manufacturer’s total
profit is = αuλH (V
h − V `) + V ` − δ(2− αu).
If the manufacturer were to charge W = V h, then its total profits would be equal to λHV
h −
2δ(1− αu2 ). Hence, the optimal W = V ` iff
αuλH (V
h − V `) + V ` ≥ λHV h ⇐⇒ λH ≤
V `
αuV
` + (1− αu)V h
.
which is true since λH ≤ V
`
V h
.
This choice ofW also maximizes total channel profits. This follows from comparing 2F I+KI+
W at W = V ` with the total channel profits when W = V h.
Now total channel profits =
αuλH (3− 2αu)
(2− αu)
(V h − V `) + V ` − δ(2− αu − αp).
For this to be greater than λHV
h − δ(2− αu − αp), we need λH ≤ V
`
V h
which is true.
Proof of Proposition 3
We proceed with a series of steps.
Step 1 First, suppose β = 0, so that there are no consumers at the physical stores. We derive the
equilibrium strategies for this case, and show that Gr
2
(P ) is the same as in the world with only an
infomediary.
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From the profit invariance condition of a mixed strategy equilibrium, D1 should make the
same profit from any price P in the support of its mixed strategy as it would at a monopoly
price. Since D1 cannot differentiate across consumer types when β = 0, it must be the case
that its monopoly price is Pm1 = V
h (as shown in Proposition 1, this yields a higher profit than
V `). Hence, (λL + λH )
αu
2 (P −W ) + (1 − αu)(P −W )Gr2(P ) − F = (λL + λH ) αu2 (V h −W ) −
F and Gr
2
(P ) = αu (V
h−P )
2(1−αu )(P−W ) Therefore, the distribution of P
r
2
, Gr
2
(P ), is identical to that in
Proposition 1. This further yields that Pˆ h = αu (V
h−W )
2−αu +W , as before. Similarly for D2, profit
from pricing at any P ∈ [Pˆ h, V h] should be the same as the profit from pricing at Pˆ h. Hence,
(λL + λH )
(αu
2 (P
m
2
−W ) + (1− αu) Gm1 (P ) (P −W )
) − K = (λL + λH ) (αu2 (Pm2 − W ) + (1 −
αu) Gm1 (Pˆ
h) (Pˆ h −W ))−K which implies Gm
1
(P ) = (Pˆ
h−W )
(P r
2
−W ) =
αu (V
h−W )
(2−αu )(P−W ) .
Next, for the β = 0 case, we show that the strategies exhibited in the Proposition do constitute
an equilibrium. Note that Pm1 = V
h is the monopoly price that for D1 in its captive segment. If
P r
2
is set to any price above this, D2 will make no sales at P r2 , so it must price at or below V
h.
Further, by construction, Gm
1
(P ) and Gr
2
(P ) are best responses by the dealers, so a deviation to
prices below Pˆ h is not profitable either.
Finally, consider Gm
2
(P ). First, observe that any price above V h is sub-optimal, compared to
V h, since it loses all consumers in this segment. Suppose D2 sets Pm2 = P < V
h. There are three
effects on profit, as compared to charging Pm
2
= V h.
(a) in its captive segment, of size αu2 , it loses (λL + λH )
αu
2 (V
h − P ) = αu2 (V h − P ),
(b) in the segment of mass (1− αu − αp), if P < P r2 < Pm1 , it cannibalizes its own sales, and loses
an amount (λL + λH ) (1 − αu − αp) Gm1 (P ) Gr2(P ) Prob(P r2 < Pm1 | P r2 > P ) {E(P r2 | P < P r2 <
Pm
1
)−P}, where E(P r
2
| P < P r
2
< Pm
1
) is the expected price at which the cannibalized sales were
being made (the conditioning event is that P < P r
2
< Pm
1
),
(c) finally, in the segment of mass (1−αu −αp), if P < Pm1 < P r2 , it wins some sales over from D1,
leading to a gain (λL + λH ) (1− αu − αp) Gm1 (P ) Gr2(P ) Prob(Pm1 < P r2 | P < Pm1 ) (P −W ).
Replacing the relevant expressions for Gm
1
(P ) and Gr
2
(P ), and evaluating the conditional prob-
abilities and expectations, we find that, in overall terms, the firm loses some profit. Hence, it will
not deviate to Pm
2
< V h.
Step 2 Suppose β = 1. Then, the strategies exhibited constitute an equilibrium. This step follows
immediately from Proposition 1; for β = 1, the game reduces to the game in Figure 2.
Step 3 : For all values of β ∈ (0, 1), the strategies exhibited constitute an equilibrium.
Notice that Gr
2
(P ), the distribution of P r
2
, is exactly identical in the two cases β = 0 and
β = 1. Further, there is no consumer who observes both an offline price and a manufacturer
referral price. That is, P1(V
h), P1(V
`), P2(V
h), P2(V
`) are set as best responses only to each other
and P r
2
, and are not affected by Pm
1
, Pm
2
. Similarly, Pm
1
, Pm
2
are set as best responses only to each
other and P r
2
. Hence, it is immediate that, given that Gr
2
(P ) is the same in both cases, when β > 0,
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P1(V
h), G`
1
(P ), P2(V
h), P2(V
`), and Gm
1
(P ), Pm
2
, are mutual best responses. Finally, since Gr
2
(P )
is a best response for both the β = 0 and β = 1 cases, it must continue to be so when β ∈ (0, 1).
Step 4 : Neither dealer has an incentive to deviate.
The details of this step are provided in the Technical Appendix.
As in Proposition 1, the threshold wholesale price Wˆm comes from a no-deviation condition
on D2. In Proposition 4, we show that the expected gross profit of D2 in equilibrium in the
web segment is (1 − β)λH αu2 4−3αu2−αu (V
h −W ). Since the strategies in the physical segment are
unchanged, the gross profit of D2 is
βE(p˜ii2) + (1− β)λH
αu
2
4− 3αu
2− αu
(V h −W ), , (11)
where E(p˜ii2) is as defined by equation (16).
As we show in the Technical Appendix, if D2 instead deviates to a strategy with P2(V
`) =
V `, Pm
2
= V `, P2(V
h) = V h, and P r
2
randomized over [Pˆ `, V `], the profit after deviation is
β
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W ) + β αp(V ` −W ) +
+β (1− αu − αp)(V ` −W ) + (1− β)(1−
αu
2
)(V ` −W ). (12)
If W = V `, the expression in equation (12) reduces to β λH
αu
2 (V
h − V `), and exactly equals the
first term in equation (11). Since the second term in (11) are also positive, the equilibrium profit
is strictly higher. Hence, for values of W close enough to V `, the deviated profit must continue to
be less than the equilibrium profit. Setting the expressions in equations (11) and (12) equal yields
the threshold value Wˆm.
Proof of Proposition 4
(i) First, note that the strategies of both firms in the β segments of the market have not changed.
Hence, the expected sales of D1 in these segments amount to as those from before (from Proposition
1). Consider the sales of D1 in the (1 − β) segments. Its expected sales here amount to λH (1 −
β)
(
αu
2 +
∫ V h
Pˆh
(1− αu) Gr2(P ) gm1 (P )dP
)
= λH (1 − β)
(
1
2−αu −
αu
2
)
. Since the total size of the
market is constant, the expected sales of D2 are E(Sm2 ) = 1−E(Sm1 ) = 1−λH (1−β)
(
1
2−αu −
αu
2
)
.
(ii) The expected manufacturer referral price of D1 (accounting for the mass point at Pm) is
E(Pm
1
) = (1−Gm1 (V h))
∫ V h
Pˆh
Pgm1 (P ) dP+G
m
1 (V
h) V h, which yields the expression in the statement
of the Proposition. The expected infomediary price of D2, E(P r2 ) does not change, compared
to Proposition 1, since the distribution of P r
2
is the same in equilibrium. Hence it is given by
E(P r
2
) =
∫ Pm
Pˆh
P gr2(P )dP =W +
αu (ln
2−αu
αu
) (V h−W )
2(1−αu ) .
(iii) The profit of D1 from the web segment is
E(pim1 ) = (1− β) λH
∫ Pm
Pˆh
(
αu
2
+ (1− αu)Gr2(P )
)
(P −W ) gm1 (P )dP
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= (1− β)λH (
αu (V h −W )
2
).
The profit of D2, E(pim2 ), is
(1− β)λH
{
αu
2
(V ` −W ) +
∫ Pm
Pˆh
(1− αu)Gm1 (P ) (P −W ); gr2(P )dP
}
= (1− β)λH (
αu(4− 3αu) (V h −W )
2(2− αu)
.
Proof of Proposition 5
(i) The optimal values of Fm and Km follow immediately from the expressions for E(pim1 ) and
E(pim2 ) in Proposition 4, following the same logic as in Proposition 2. Hence
Fm = βF I + (1− β)λH (
αu (V h − V `)
2
) (13)
Km = βKI + (1− β)λH (
αu(1− αu) (V h − V `)
2− αu
). (14)
(ii) Note that the total sales of the product are the same in both cases, with and without manufac-
turer referrals. Hence, the difference in the manufacturer’s profit is just Fm−F I . Further, in each
case, the optimal franchise fee is exactly equal to the gross profits of retailer 1 (that is, the profits
without subtracting out the franchise fee). To show that Fm > F I , we show that the difference in
the gross profits of D1 is positive.
From Proposition 2 and Proposition 4, the difference in the gross profits of D1 after the estab-
lishment of the manufacturer’s referral service is
(1− β)
(
αu λH (V
h − V `)
2
− E(pio1)
)
= (1− β)
(
1− αu
2
)
δ.
Since (1− β) > 0, this difference is positive.
Proof of Proposition 6
Recall equation (4). Compare this to equation (2) and take the difference. We get(
αu
(3− 2αu)
(2− αu)
− 1
)
(λH (V
h − V `)) + δ(1− β)(2− αu − αp) + V `((1− β)λH − 1).
Now αu (3−2αu )2−αu < 1, so the first term is always negative. The third term is also always negative.
However, β < 1 and (2 − αu − αp) > 1, so the second term could be positive or negative. Since
the equation is linear, one can find a critical value of δ or a critical value of β, beyond which this
difference is always positive.
Proof of Proposition 7
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In the absence of the referral price from the Infomediary, both dealers become symmetric: Each
has two offline prices (for high and low valuation customers) and 1 manufacturer referral price.
Following the steps outlined in the Proof of Proposition 1 and 2, one can show that the equilibrium
pricing strategies consists of the following: The manufacturer chooses a wholesale price W ≥ Wˆ
and there exists an equilibrium in which:
(i) P1(V
h), P1(V
`), P2(V
h), and P2(V
`) are set exactly as in Lemma 1 (a),
(ii) Pm
1
and Pm
2
are randomly chosen over [Pˆ h, V h], where Pˆ h = W + (αu+αp )(V
h−W )
(2−αu−αp ) . Further,
Gm
1
(P ) = αu (V
h−P )
2(αu+αp )(P−W ) .
The total profits of the manufacturer are 2F +W =
2
(
β(
(αu + αp)λH (V
h −W )
2
− δ) + (1− β)(1− αu − αp)αu
2λH (V
h −W )
(αu + αp)(1− αu)
)
+ (β + λH (1− β)V `).
Comparing this to the total profits of the Manufacturer given by 2Fm +W from (13), we find
that the difference is always positive when β = 0, while the difference can be negative when β = 1.
Given that the expression is linear in β, we can then find the critical value of β such that the
Proposition then follows.
Appendix B
7.1 Suppose the Infomediary Enrols both Retailers
Types αu2
αu
2 αp 1− αu − αp
HV Consumers P1(V
h) P2(V
h) P1(V
h), P r
1
, P r
2
P1(V
h), P2(V
h), P r
1
, P r
2
LV Consumers P1(V
`) P2(V
`) P2(V
`), P r
1
, P r
2
P1(V
h), P2(V
h), P r
1
, P r
2
Table 1: Different prices observed by each consumer segment
In this case the equilibrium prices are P1(V h) = P2(V h) = V h and P1(V `) = P2(V `) = V `.
P r1 = P
r
2
= W. This gives profits of each retailer = λH (
αu
2 (V
h −W ) + λL(αu2 (V ` −W ) + αp(W −
W ) + (1− αu − αp)(W −W )− δ(1− αu2 ) = αu2 (λHV h + λLV ` −W )− δ(1− αu2 ). It is immediate
to show that the gross profits of each retailer are either less than (for D2) or equal to (for D1) the
profits when neither of them are enrolled with the infomediary. Hence the infomediary will enroll
only one retailer. This also implies that only one retailer will wish to enroll with the infomediary.
7.2 Suppose the Manufacturer Enrols One Retailer
Notice from Tables (2) and (3) that the prices observed by the αp segment remain unchanged, when
the manufacturer enrolls only the non-Infomediary enrolled dealer. Further, the (1−β)(1−αu−αp)
segment becomes equivalent to the (1 − β)αp segment, in terms of the prices they observe. This
prevents the non-enrollment of D2 by the manufacturer referral service, from having any impact
on D′1s, and consequently, the manufacturer’s own profits.
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Types βαu2
(1−β)αu
2
αu
2 βαp (1−β)αp β(1−αu−αp ) (1−β)(1−αu−αp )
HV P1 (V h) Pm1 P2 (V h) P1 (V h),P r2 P
m
1
,P r
2 P1 (V
h),P2 (V
h),P r
2
Pm
1
,P r
2
LV P1 (V `) Pm1 P2 (V `) P1 (V `),P r2 P
m
2
,P r
2 P1 (V
`),P2 (V
`),P r
2
Pm
1
,P r
2
Table 2: Different Prices Observed by Each Segment if Manufacturer Enrols One Retailer
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8 Technical Appendix for Reviewers
Proof of Proposition 1
Details of Step 2 :
Having constructed the equilibrium, we prove that the conjectured strategies constitute an
equilibrium. Consider D1 first. Since all its sales are offline, it knows the consumer type before
it chooses its price for each consumer. Hence, a deviation in P1(V
h) or P1(V
`) does not affect its
profit from consumers of type V ` or V h, respectively. That is, it is sufficient to rule out deviations
in each of P1(V
h) and P1(V
`) in isolation. By construction, Gh1 and G
`
1 are best responses, ruling
out such deviations.
Next, consider firm 2. This dealer is choosing three prices, P2(V
h), P2(V
`), P r
2
. Since all three
are chosen jointly to maximize its profits, to show that its choices are optimal, we must consider
joint deviations in these prices.
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For clarity, we first show that each price is optimal given the other two prices D2 charges, and
then consider joint deviations in two or more prices.
First, consider P2(V
h). At any price P ∈ [V `, V h], D2 sells only to its own captive segment,
αu
2 , of the high type consumer. Since sales are unchanged at all these prices, V
h is optimal in this
set.
Finally we show that it is not optimal for D2 to set P2(V
h) < V h. Suppose it does charge
P2(V
h) < V h. There are three effects on profit, compared to charging P2(V
h) = V h:
(a) in its captive segment, it loses λH
αu
2 (V
h − P2(V h)),
(b) In the fully informed segment (of mass (1 − αu − αp)), it was not making sales at all; it was
fighting for the high types using P r
2
by randomizing it between (Pˆ h, V h). By reducing its price
below V h, in the segment of mass (1−αu −αp), if P < P r2 < V h, it cannibalizes its own sales, and
loses an amount λH (1− αu − αp) Gh1(P ) Gr2(P ) Prob(P r2 < P1(V h) | P r2 > P ) {E(P r2 − P2(V h))},
where E(P r
2
| P < P r
2
< P2(V
h) is the expected price at which the cannibalized sales were being
made (the conditioning event is that P < P r
2
< P1(V
h)).
(c) finally, in the segment of mass (1−αu −αp), if P < P1(V h) < P r2 , it wins some sales over from
D1, leading to a gain λH (1− αu − αp) Gh1(P ) Gr2(P ) Prob(P1(V h) < P r2 | P < P1(V h)) (P −W ).
Replacing the relevant expressions for Gh1(P ) and G
r
2
(P ), and evaluating the conditional prob-
abilities and expectations, we find that, in overall terms, the firm incurs a net loss from deviation,
given by
αu(
V h − P
2
)(1 +
(αu(1− αu − αp)(V h −W )(2(V h − P )(V h + P − 2W )
2(2− αu)(1− αu)(V ` −W )(V h + P − 2W )(P −W )
+
(3P + V h − 4W )(V h −W )(Log (P−W )
(V h−W ))
2(2− αu)(1− αu)(V h −W )(V h + P − 2W )(P −W )
).
20 Hence, it will not deviate to P2(V
h) < V h.
20For brevity, algebraic details that do not provide insight into the model are omitted here but are available from
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By construction, P2(V
`) and P r
2
are best responses. Hence, deviating in one of these alone
cannot improve the profit of D2.
Next, we look at possible joint deviations forD2. SupposeD2 chooses some prices P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`).
For now, ignore acquisition costs and franchise and referral fees—none of these terms change as the
prices P r
2
, P2(V
h), P2(V
`) change. Then, the gross profits for D2 can be written as follows.
pi2(P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`)) =
αu
2
(λHP2(V
h) + λLP2(V
`)−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (15)
αp
(
λHG
h
1
(P r
2
)(P r
2
−W ) + λLG`1(P r2 )(P r2 −W ) 1P r2≤V `
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (1− αu − αp)
(
λHG
h
1(min{P r2 , P2(V h)})(min{P r2 , P2(V h)} −W ) +
λLG
`
1(min{P r2 , P2(V `)})(min{P r2 , P2(V `)} −W )
)
The first term is the profits of the dealer from the high and low valuation customers in the
uninformed segment of mass αu . The second term indicates its profit from the low valuation
and high valuation customers in the partially informed segment of mass αp . Recall that in this
segment, the consumers are seeing two prices, P r
2
and P1(V
h) or P r
2
and P1(V
`) (depending on
whether they are high types or low types). Hence for D2 to make any sales, there should exist
a positive probability that P r
2
> P1(V
h) and P r
2
> P1(V
`). The third term indicates its profits
from the high valuation and low valuation customers in the fully informed segment. Recall that in
this segment, the consumers are seeing two prices of D2, P r2 , P2(V
h) or P r
2
, P2(V
`) (depending on
whether they are high types or low types). Hence any sales that D2 makes in these segments will
occur only at the minimum of (P r
2
, P2(V
h)) for the high types and minimum of (P r
2
, P2(V
h)) for
the low types.
The gross profit in equilibrium of D2 can be determined by substituting P r2 = V
h, P2(V
h) = V h,
and P2(V
`) = V ` (since any choice of P r
2
, P2(V
`) in the stated range leads to the same profit). This
the authors on request.
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leads to an equilibrium gross profit for D2 given by
pi∗2 =
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+αp
(
αu
2− αu
)
λH (V
h −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+
+
{
(1− αu − αp)
(
λH
αu
2− αu
(V h −W ) + λL
2αp
2− αu
(V ` −W )
)
(16)
Now, consider a deviation by firm 2. Note that it will never choose P2(V
`) outside the range
[Pˆ `, V `]. Any price higher than V ` leads to no sales at the price P2(V
`), so such prices are dominated
by V `. Similarly, any price lower than Pˆ `, given the strategy of D1, is dominated by Pˆ `. Hence,
we consider deviations by firm 2 in P r
2
and P2(V
h). The following deviations are feasible:
1. Suppose V ` < P r
2
< Pˆ h and P2(V
h) < V h. There could be two possibilities here:
(i) P r
2
< P2(V
h)
(ii) P r
2
> P2(V
h).
Consider equation (15) and case (i) first. From the first scenario, it turns out that
min{P r
2
, P2(V
h)} is less than Pˆ h. SoGh1(min{P r2 , P2(V h)}) = 1. In the same vein, G`1(min{P r2 , P2(V `)}) =
0 and (minP −W ) < (Pˆ h −W ). If the deviation occurs, the deviated profits are given by
pi2 =
αu
2
(λHP + λLV
` −W ) + αpλH (P −W ) + (1− αu − αp)λH (P −W ). (17)
Since P < Pˆ h, V
h−W
P−W ≥ 2−αuαu , from the definition of Pˆ
h. Thus it is shown that each of
the terms in equation (17) turn out to be lower than or equal to the corresponding terms in
equation (16). Hence, D2 does not have a profitable deviation.
From the second scenario, in the claimed equilibrium, we have P r
2
being randomized
between (Pˆ h, V h). Hence, it again turns out that min{P r
2
, P2(V
h)} is less than Pˆ h. Thus, D2
does not have a profitable deviation.
2. Suppose P r
2
≤ V `. Then, it cannot be profitable to set P2(V h) such that V ` < P2(V h) < V h.
This is because, in the fully informed segment, no consumer buys at the price P2(V
h) (since
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all these consumers also see the lower price P r
2
). Further, in the uninformed segment, this
leads to lower profit from the high valuation consumers.
Further, if P r
2
< V `, it cannot be profitable to set P2(V
h) < V `. Again, D2 earns less
in the uninformed segment; in the remaining fully informed segment, at best, it cannibalizes
sales it would otherwise have made at the price P r
2
(if P2(V
h) < P r
2
).
3. Next, suppose that P r
2
≤ V `, and P2(V `) < P r2 , with P2(V h) = V h. In a similar manner to
(1) above, it can be shown that D2 cannot deviate to any profitable equilibrium since it only
loses profits in the uninformed segments.
4. Finally we check for the case when P2(V
`) = V `, P r
2
≤ V ` and P2(V h) = V h. From equation
(15) and (16) we find that the deviation is unprofitable iff (1−αu)(Pˆ `−W ) ≤ λH (1−αu)(Pˆ h−
W )+(1−αu−αp)λL(V `−W ) 2αu(2−αu ) . Solving the equality for W leads to the threshold value
of Wˆ .
Thus, the specified strategies constitute an equilibrium, as long as W ≥ Wˆ .
Proof of Proposition 3
Details of Step 4
Consider D1 first. In the physical (β) segment, since all its sales are offline, it knows the
consumer type before it chooses its price for each consumer. Hence, a deviation in P1(V
h) or
P1(V
`) does not affect its profit from consumers of type V ` or V h, respectively. That is, it is
sufficient to rule out deviations in each of P1(V
h) and P1(V
`) in isolation. Similarly, any deviation
in Pm1 does not affect its profit in the physical segment. In the web (1−β) segment, by construction,
Gm1 is a best responses, ruling out such deviations. Finally, since any change in P1(V
h) or P1(V
`)
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does not impact sales made by D1 at Pm1 in the web segment, any joint deviation in all 3 prices
does not fetch higher profits.
Next we rule out possible joint deviations forD2. SupposeD2 chooses some prices P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`), Pm
2
.
For now, ignore acquisition costs and franchise and referral fees—none of these terms change as the
prices P r
2
, P2(V
h), P2(V
`), Pm
2
change. Then, the gross profits for D2 can be written as follows.
pi2(P r2 , P2(V
h), P2(V
`), Pm
2
) = β(
αu
2
(λHP2(V
h) + λLP2(V
`)−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (18)
β(αp
(
λHG
h
1
(P r
2
)(P r
2
−W ) + λLG`1(P r2 )(P r2 −W ) 1P r2≤V `
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸) + β((1− αu − αp)
(
λHG
h
1(min{P r2 , P2(V h)})(min{P r2 , P2(V h)} −W ) +
λLG
`
1(min{P r2 , P2(V `)})(min{P r2 , P2(V `)} −W )
)
)

+ (1− β)(αu
2
(λHP
m
2
+ λLP
m
2
−W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+ (19)
(1− β)(αp
(
λHG
m
1 (P
r
2
)(P r
2
−W ) + λLGm1 (P r2 )(P r2 −W ) 1P r2≤V `
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸) +{
(1− β)(1− αu − αp)
(
λHG
m
1 (min{P r2 , Pm2 })(min{P r2 , Pm2 } −W ) +
λLG
m
1 (min{P r2 , Pm2 })(min{P r2 , Pm2 } −W )
) }
The gross profit in equilibrium of D2 can be determined by substituting P r2 = V
h, Pm
2
= V h,
P2(V
h) = V h, and P2(V
`) = V ` (since any choice of P r
2
, P2(V
`) in the stated range leads to the
same profit). This leads to an equilibrium gross profit for D2 given by
pi∗2 = β
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+β αp
(
αu
2− αu
)
λH (V
h −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+
+
{
β(1− αu − αp)
(
λH
αu
2− αu
(V h −W ) + λL
2αp
2− αu
(V ` −W )
)
+ (1− β) αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+(1− β)αp
(
αu
2− αu
)
λH (V
h −W )︸ ︷︷ ︸+
+
{
(1− β)(1− αu − αp)
(
λH
αu
2− αu
(V h −W ) + λL
αu
2− αu
(V h −W )
)
(20)
1. In the β segment, deviations in P2(V
h), P2(V
`), P r
2
can be ruled out as done earlier in Propo-
sition 1.
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2. Consider the (1 − β) segment. D2 has two strategies P r2 and Pm2 . Suppose V ` < P r2 < Pˆ h
and Pm
2
< V h. There could be two possibilities here:
(i) P r
2
< Pm
2
(ii) P r
2
> Pm
2
.
Consider equation (19) and case (i) first. From the first scenario, it turns out that
minP r
2
, Pm
2
is less than Pˆ h. So Gm1 (minP
r
2
, Pm
2
) = 1 and (minP −W ) < (Pˆ h −W ). Then it
can be shown, similar to the Proof of Proposition 1 that each of the terms in equation (19)
turn out to be lower than or equal to the corresponding terms in equation (20). Hence, D2
does not have a profitable deviation.
From the second scenario, in the claimed equilibrium, we have P r
2
being randomized
between (Pˆ h, V h). Hence, it again turns out that min{P r
2
, Pm
2
} is less than Pˆ h. Thus, D2
does not have a profitable deviation.
3. Suppose P r
2
≤ V `. Then, it cannot be profitable to set Pm
2
such that V ` < Pm
2
< V h. This
is because, in the fully informed segment, no consumer buys at the price Pm
2
(since all these
consumers also see the lower price P r
2
). Further, in the uninformed segment, this leads to
lower profit from the high valuation consumers. Further, if P r
2
< V `, it cannot be profitable
to set Pm
2
< V `. Again, D2 earns less in the uninformed segment; in the remaining fully
informed segment, at best, it cannibalizes sales it would otherwise have made at the price P r
2
(if Pm
2
< P r
2
).
4. Finally we check for the case when P2(V
`) = V `, P r
2
≤ V `, Pm
2
= V ` and P2(V
h) = V h. The
deviated profits are given by
β
αu
2
(λHV
h + λLV
` −W ) + β αp(V ` −W ) +
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+β (1− αu − αp)(V ` −W ) + (1− β)(1−
αu
2
)(V ` −W ).
Comparing this with equation (20), leads us to the critical value of the wholesale price Wˆm.
For wholesale prices W ≥ Wˆm, the deviation is not profitable. Thus, the specified strategies
constitute an equilibrium for all W ≥ Wˆm.
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